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Three widespread assumptions of Cognitive-affective Neuroscience are discussed: first,
mental functions are assumed to be localized in circumscribed brain areas which can
be exactly determined, at least in principle (localizationism). Second, this assumption is
associated with the more general claim that these functions (and dysfunctions, such as in
neurological or mental diseases) are somehow generated inside the brain (internalism).
Third, these functions are seen to be “biological” in the sense that they can be
decomposed and finally explained on the basis of elementary biological causes (i.e.,
genetic, molecular, neurophysiological etc.), causes that can be identified by experimental
methods as the gold standard (isolationism). Clinical neuropsychology is widely assumed
to support these tenets. However, by making reference to the ideas of Kurt Goldstein
(1878–1965), one of its most important founders, I argue that none of these assumptions
is sufficiently supported. From the perspective of a clinical-neuropsychological practitioner,
assessing and treating brain damage sequelae reveals a quite different picture of the brain
as well as of us “brain carriers”, making the organism (or person) in its specific environment
the crucial reference point. This conclusion can be further elaborated: all experimental
and clinical research on humans presupposes the notion of a situated, reflecting, and
interacting subject, which precedes all kinds of scientific decomposition, however useful.
These implications support the core assumptions of the embodiment approach to brain
and mind, and, as I argue, Goldstein and his clinical-neuropsychological observations are
part of its very origin, for both theoretical and historical reasons.
Keywords: clinical neuropsychology, kurt goldstein, localization, embodiment, psychological experiments, critical
neuroscience
In pathologischen Fällen haben wir es etwa beim Aphasischen nicht
mit einem Menschen mit veränderter Sprache zu tun, sondern mit
einem veränderten Menschen, dessen Veränderung sich uns in Verän-
derungen seiner Sprache, aber auch in den verschiedensten anderen
Erscheinungen kundtut. Also betrachte man nie eine Erscheinung
isoliert vom ganzen kranken Menschen.
[In pathological cases, such as aphasia, we do not deal with a human
individual with changes in language but we deal with changes in
a human individual, which manifest as changes in language, but
also in a range of further phenomena. Thus, never investigate a
phenomenon in isolation from the context of the diseased individual
(my transl.)]
(Goldstein, 1927, p. 630)
OUTLINE: THREE WEIGHTY ASSUMPTIONS TOO RARELY
QUESTIONED
There are at least three widespread assumptions in Cognitive-
affective Neuroscience (CNS) that seem to guide many research
efforts, knowingly or unknowingly. The first is localizationism:
functions are assumed to be localized in circumscribed brain
areas which can be clearly identified. In this way, even complex
functions can be decomposed and related to specific parts of the
brain (Kandel, 1998; Price and Friston, 2002; Ardila and Bernal,
2007; Kandel et al., 2013) and the brain essentially exhibits a
modular organization (Friston and Price, 2011). Thus, by deter-
mining the role of each brain area experimentally, we finally
gain a complete understanding of how the brain works, at least
in principle. The second idea is entailed in the first, but not
vice versa, so it will be treated as a separate claim: internal-
ism. Here, it is assumed that cognitive functions are somehow
causally produced inside brains (Crick and Koch, 2003; Kandel
et al., 2013). Understanding and reconstructing the computa-
tional principles of the brain (even in silico), can reveal how
mental functions are actually generated (Kandel et al., 2013)
and how mental disorders can be conceived of as brain prod-
ucts as well (Kandel, 1998; Insel and Quirion, 2005; Kandel
et al., 2013). The third assumption I will call isolationism in
order to highlight a fundamental methodological strategy: all
scientific knowledge about mind and brain must be derived
from controlled experiments in which the investigated phe-
nomenon is isolated under laboratory conditions. The result-
ing effects can then be put together into a broader picture.
In this way, the experimental method is “. . . a straightfor-
ward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely
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covers . . . all the ground” of mental phenomena (Dennett, 2003,
p. 19).
In this context, clinical neuropsychology is mainly seen as a
source of evidence in favor of the assumptions just described,
especially by contributing evidence for lesion-deficit correlations.
According to this view, clinical neuropsychologists objectively
identify deficits by means of standardized tests which they then
relate to lesion sites in the brain, in order to provide evidence for
the causal role of a specific brain area. Most importantly, this com-
plements experimental imaging studies which can only provide
correlative evidence for brain-function-relationships (Pascual-
Leone et al., 1999; Price and Friston, 2002; Ardila and Bernal,
2007; Friston and Price, 2011). Deficits are mainly seen as quan-
titative changes in performance relative to the mean of a group
of controls (Price and Friston, 2002; Noppeney et al., 2004). Such
“clinical data” can then be used to reconstruct or even simulate
how deficits are produced by diseased or lesioned brains (Kandel
et al., 2013), in order to then enable the clinician to manipulate
the respective brain mechanisms accordingly.
Certainly, there are cases in which working with lesion data
based on these assumptions is adequate. However, generalizing
them creates a biased, oversimplified and finally distorted picture
of what clinical neuropsychologists actually do and of how brain
lesions (and by extension: brains) work. When looking from
the perspective of a clinical practitioner, a very different picture
of the brain emerges, as I will argue, a picture which is much
less compatible with the three above assumptions as may be
expected. The German neurologist Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965)
shall serve as my principal protagonist, for two reasons: first,
Goldstein co-developed the first thorough psychological studies
on brain damaged patients (Gelb and Goldstein, 1920). He can
therefore count as a founder of modern clinical neuropsychology
(Luria, 1966) and of an approach to the patient which I find
most appropriate for reasons which I will elaborate on below.
Second, as a disciple of Carl Wernicke, Goldstein grew up in
the mechanist and localizationist thinking of 19th century apha-
siology, but profoundly changed his views on the brain in the
course of his diagnostic and therapeutic work with countless
brain-damaged WW1 soldiers. Retracing Goldstein’s motives for
his radical turn reveals interesting insights that may have con-
siderable relevance for today’s neuroscientific research, despite
their age.
GOLDSTEIN’S TURN: A MORE APPROPRIATE VIEW OF BRAIN
LESIONS (AND BRAINS)
The idea that mental abilities are specifically located in circum-
scribed brain areas dates back to antiquity, but gains considerable
prestige in the “classical” period of neurology in the 19th century,
where it becomes the dominating—though never undisputed—
view on the structure-function relationship. Goldstein’s supervi-
sor Carl Wernicke (1848–1905) assumed that complex functions
such as language could be decomposed into elementary mecha-
nisms that were specifically localized in the brain. The classical
method was to describe the clinical signs and to relate them to
lesion sites which were determined post mortem in most cases.
These different observations were then assembled into models of
function. In the case of language, “motor images” of words were
assumed to be stored in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s
area) and “sound images” of words in the left superior tempo-
ral gyrus (Wernicke’s area). Connections between the two areas
were seen as connecting speech sounds to speech movements,
e.g., when repeating words. Thus, lesions could not only affect
the different types of representation, but also the connections
between them, thereby producing the different types of aphasic
signs (production, comprehension, repetition etc.). Even though
this research method became quite successful, it had prominent
opponents, such as John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911) and
Constantin von Monakow (1853–1930).
As Wernicke’s disciple, Goldstein initially stood under the
influence of a localizationist view. However, as the director of
the Institut für die Erforschung der Folgeerscheinungen von Hirn-
verletzungen (Institute for Research on the Aftereffects of Brain
Injury) at Frankfurt University from 1915 on, where he was
responsible for the assessment and treatment of brain-damaged
WW1 veterans, he ultimately changed his views. Goldstein (1926,
1934) criticized the localizationist’s notion of “clinical sign” which
he found was misconstrued as a transparent, steady, and mono-
lithic phenomenon. By contrast, Goldstein argued that such an
approach of just quantifying isolated phenomena was artificial
in a way as it did not account for qualitative aspects of the—
organismic/personal and situational—context, for several rea-
sons: first, the patient does not display a loss of function in the
transparent way a machine does (e.g., pressing a switch does not
illuminate a bulb anymore), but tries to give the best possible
answers to the questions posed by the examiner. Thus, responses
are bound to the interactional and situational context of the
examination. Second, clinical signs are not only dynamic (i.e.,
changing) in a diachronic perspective (von Monakow), but they
may also change depending on the situational context (Hughlings
Jackson). As an example, patients may be able to produce one and
the same word in a concrete, real-world situation (e.g., conversa-
tion, praying, swearing etc.) but not in the clinical examination
where they have to abstract from the usual usage (e.g., when
naming pictures). These problems may point to more basic, global
disturbances (e.g., in abstraction) which may surface in a range of
different phenomena. In relation to this, one and the same clinical
sign may come about in very different ways across different situ-
ations and/or patients. Thus, a thorough (psychological) analysis
of how a response was produced would be at least as important as
the finding that it was produced (see also Goldstein and Scheerer,
1941).
Goldstein showed that the localizationists’ claims were repeat-
edly “confirmed” not only because their investigations were
guided by implicit, a priori assumptions (i.e., that clinical signs
are context-independent and localized in circumscribed areas
in the brain) but also by explaining away contradictory evi-
dence. According to his own observations, focal brain lesions
almost never led to a unidimensional outcome with one type
of performance (e.g., language production) being completely
lost, while all other capacities remained completely unaffected.
Instead of interpreting this just as a result of methodological
insufficiencies in specifying the deficit and/or the lesion, however,
Goldstein called the localizationists’ machine-like model of the
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brain into question. He concluded that it was inappropriate for
the explanation of biological phenomena. He demonstrated that
a more comprehensive description of brain damage sequelae
revealed changes on different levels: brain injured patients not
only lose specific abilities while keeping others, but the whole
range of abilities is modified. Responses are becoming “amor-
phous”, i.e., less differentiated, and organism and environment
enter a new relationship (new quality or Gestalt). Accordingly,
the outcome of a brain damage can only be adequately captured
in the context of the whole organism, which tries to reach a
new arrangement with its environment in order to preserve and
maximize its possibilities. This can even be observed in the
case of seemingly “basic” functions such as vision, as Goldstein
argued by making reference to the work of one of his assistants
on the so-called pseudofovea (Fuchs, 1922). Fuchs had reported
the case of a veteran whose calcarine fissure (primary visual
cortex) in one hemisphere had been completely destroyed and
who had developed a contralateral homonymous hemianopia
(loss of one half of the visual field) as demonstrated in a visual
field test (perimetry). In a series of experiments, Fuchs demon-
strated that a new site of sharpest vision had developed that
differed from the anatomical macula and varied depending on
properties of the outside scenery (distance and size of objects,
viewing angle etc.). When the patient had to indicate the sharp-
ness of adjacent symbols, the point of maximum focus was
not reported as being located at the edge of the visual field,
as it should have been according to the perimetry. Instead, it
dynamically shifted towards the center of the remaining visual
field where it was surrounded by a periphery of decreasing
sharpness, as it was familiar to the patient. This pseudofovea had
developed unconsciously and relatively fast, and thus could not
be explained by explicit training. Goldstein interpreted this as a
result of the organism’s tendency to try to accomplish tasks in
its environment in the usual way as long as possible (Goldstein,
1934).
Here, “environment” is not synonymous with external world
in the sense of an ecological niche. Goldstein was influenced
by ideas of the biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) who
promoted the term Umwelt (literally: “the world around”, often
translated as “subjective world/universe”) in order to describe
those parts of the physical world that a specific organism has
access to and that are meaningful to it. As an example, my
terrace can be taken as some kind of independently existing,
physical object. Nevertheless, it constitutes fundamentally differ-
ent Umwelten for different organisms, such as me, a bird and a
fly, as it provides disparate networks of meaningful (and mostly
incommensurable) relationships for the three species (Magnus,
2008; Stjernfelt, 2011). Each organism succeeds “in shaping its
environment” (Goldstein, 1934, p. 85) through a permanent
interaction with its Umwelt, which also includes social relations
(ibid., p. 338). The concept of Umwelt becomes crucial for
Goldstein’s conception of what happens in the case of brain
damage: damage to the brain leads, above all, to discrepancies
between the organism’s abilities and the demands of its Umwelt
due to the abrupt and drastic changes that cannot be adjusted
for. This unsettles the organism in an existential way, as it had
been used to a close and never challenged union with its Umwelt.
The organism is longing for balance. It can achieve this, mostly
unconsciously, in multiple ways: by changes in self-awareness
(especially, awareness of the deficit), by reducing its Umwelt in
order to avoid external demands that cannot be met, by seeking
increased control over the environment (through orderliness,
rigidity etc.), by compensating by means of other abilities, to
name only a few.
Thus, the damage does not just take something from the
organism, but the organism reacts to the changes and a new rela-
tionship to the Umwelt develops, leading to modifications on both
sides. These multiple, interrelated changes reveal that organism
and Umwelt are inextricably intertwined as well as constantly re-
established through activity. This idea seems to anticipate the
concept of autopoiesis (Magnus, 2008, p. 390), especially in its later
versions (such as in Varela, 1997; see also Thompson, 2007).
Brain damage profoundly disturbs the organism-Umwelt cou-
pling and the organism’s general tendency to preserve an identity.
Therefore, it provides a very interesting instance in which these
processes come to the fore and can be studied. On the other
hand, brain damage itself can be understood in its full range
only by adopting a perspective beyond the brain itself, namely
in a brain-organism-Umwelt context. In contrast to many com-
peting attempts to fully decompose properties of life into basic,
explanatory units, such as reflexes, words, neurons etc., Goldstein
(1934) advocated a systems-based view. He proposed that the
concept of organism was indispensable to understand processes on
the level of the organism’s parts. Such views had and have many
prominent successors down to the present day (e.g., Varela, 1997;
Thompson, 2007), but Goldstein (1934) can take the credit for
providing decisive evidence from clinical neuro(psycho-)logical
observations.
THE WINNER IS . . . LOCALIZATIONISM?
Today, the idea of functional localization seems to be largely
confirmed by clinical as well as experimental results from modern
neuroimaging techniques (Price and Friston, 2002; Ardila and
Bernal, 2007; Friston and Price, 2011; Kandel et al., 2013). Thus,
Goldstein’s arguments against localizationism seem hopelessly
outdated at first glance. However, they still carry significance
today. Certainly, I do not want to suggest that 21st century CNS
is at the same level as 19th century neurology, neither empirically
nor conceptually. Nevertheless, at least two of Goldstein’s points
seem worth mentioning: first, “localizing” clinical signs is not the
same as localizing functions, and similarly, “localizing” experi-
mental effects is not the same as localizing functions either. An
experimental effect is—like a clinical sign—a complex, context-
dependent entity which entails a range of non-factual decisions
on the side of the investigator (choice of paradigm, statistics,
true effect vs. error etc.) as well as variables on the side of the
subject (strategies, test anxiety, reward etc.). Although some of
these can be investigated and controlled for systematically, not
all of them can, at least not simultaneously. Second, and more
importantly, the idea of modularity as a principle of organi-
zation of mind and brain (Friston and Price, 2011) seems so
pervasive that it appears in many guises, even at the risk of
immunization (van Orden et al., 2001), and despite interesting
alternatives.
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As soon as neuroimaging methods were mastered sufficiently,
research started to map mental functions onto the brain (Kosik,
2003). CNS, especially in its earlier stages, was largely domi-
nated by mapping functions in a quasi-phrenological manner
(Bates and Dick, 2000; McIntosh, 2000). The idea of the brain
as a collection of specialized areas was hardly disputed, since a
variety of studies with focal activations in specific tasks seemed
to confirm it. It was even taken for granted that function-
region associations could be inferred in both ways, also from
activation to function (reverse inference, cf. Poldrack, 2006, 2011).
Inconsistencies between studies on the same issue soon arose,
be it that one and the same experimental paradigm was found
to lead to different patterns of activation or that one and the
same area was activated in a variety of disparate tasks (Poldrack,
2006, 2011; Anderson and Finlay, 2014). However, these incon-
sistencies were often interpreted as methodological insufficiencies
which could, sooner or later, be overcome by more sophisticated
experimental designs or finer anatomical subdivisions (Kosik,
2003). The underlying localizationist assumptions were thereby
perpetuated. Even when talking of “networks”, the latter seemed
to be conceived of as ensembles of brain areas, each housing an
elementary cognitive function, such as phoneme discrimination
being important for different tasks such as reading, writing,
spelling etc. Finally, the idea behind these networks was “an
extension of [. . .] modular theories of cognition” (Ardila and
Bernal, 2007, p. 937). Although the types of function to be
localized were much more specific and theoretically elaborated,
it seemed still like “the 19th century search for isomorphic
mappings” (Bates and Dick, 2000, p. 21), with the old mental
faculties being dissipated and re-conceptualized on a lower level
(McIntosh, 2000; van Orden et al., 2001). In this respect, clinical
neuropsychology was welcome to provide causal evidence for
this idea in the form of lesion-deficit-correlations (Price and
Friston, 2002; Ardila and Bernal, 2007). Damage, according to
this view, leads to a selected failure of the specific tools that
had been provided by the area(s) now lesioned (Kanwisher,
2006).
However, if we follow Goldstein (1934) above advice and do
not just focus on isolated, theoretically interesting hypotheses, but
dare a broader perspective, we see that there is hardly any lesion
that affects one function completely while sparing everything
else. The sequelae induced even by seemingly focal changes can
indeed be manifold and dynamic (Prinz, 2006), including global
changes in overall behavior or personality. In addition, the brain
may compensate for a number of initial difficulties, at least in
the long run. This can even be seen in sudden lesions, such as
strokes, but may be very striking in lesions on a longer time-scale,
such as degenerative diseases (Riley et al., 2002) or slow growing
tumors (Desmurget et al., 2007). Such tumors very often become
first apparent through seizures rather than cognitive deficits,
even if they have the size of several centimeters (ibid.). Tumor
growth often seems to lead to internal shifts even of primary
(e.g., motor) functions which may then be widely preserved even
after tumor resection (ibid.). Likewise, tasks involving “higher”
cognitive functions activate areas in fMRI which are normally
not activated (such as BA 46 for language) (ibid.). The brain’s
dynamic is impressive as intracerebral functional reorganization
may be observed even during a brain surgery (ibid.). The same
has been shown in numerous experiments on animals (Hardcastle
and Stewart, 2005; Anderson and Finlay, 2014), a source of
evidence that had already influenced the way in which Goldstein
interpreted his clinical observations.1
THE IDEA OF DEGENERACY
As Goldstein already observed, a brain damage not only leads to
“direct” (local and global) but also to “indirect” modifications,
which reflect the reactions of the whole organism to the changes.
Eventually, these two types of changes create a new mélange
which can hardly be disassembled (see also Ben Yishay, 1996;
Prigatano, 2011). As already mentioned, this whole process is
driven by the organism’s tendency to deal with these changes and
to re-establish a new meaningful relationship with its Umwelt.
Although Goldstein’s interpretation cannot be reduced to evolu-
tionary arguments (for reasons that cannot be explicated here), it
alludes to the more general idea that biological systems have an
intrinsic ability to maintain functions in the course of structural
changes, at least to a certain degree (Kitano, 2004). Specific
functions can obviously be constituted on the basis of struc-
turally different elements, a biological property that is referred
to under the term degeneracy (Edelman and Gally, 2001). It can
be observed on different levels of analysis of biological systems,
such as genes, cells (neurons), organs (brains), (super-)organisms
etc. Even unicellular organisms easily change their molecular
structure inherently and autonomously for the sake of function
(von Uexküll, 1909; Fitch, 2008). This gives them the flexibil-
ity to adapt to changing environmental circumstances and to
maintain or reproduce their identity (Varela, 1997; Thompson,
2007). In that respect, they differ fundamentally from technical
artifacts.
The problem that brain areas activated in neuroimaging
might not be necessary for a task, is rarely—but increasingly—
accounted for in CNS by directly referring to the degeneracy con-
cept (Price and Friston, 2002; Noppeney et al., 2004; Friston and
Price, 2011). It is acknowledged that one and the same response
may be produced by structurally different neural systems, and
that this may account for the frequent finding that areas which
are activated in fMRI during a task do not necessarily affect
performance in the same task when lesioned. Noppeney et al.
(2004) distinguish degeneracy between from degeneracy within
subjects: degeneracy between subjects would explain why the same
lesion/activation leads to different outcomes or why the same
1It seems noteworthy that Goldstein (1934) made extensive reference to exper-
imental studies on animals, especially those by Albrecht Bethe (1872–1954),
a disciple of Friedrich Goltz (1934–1902). Bethe worked as a physiologist at
Frankfurt University at the same time as Goldstein. He demonstrated that the
amputation of extremities in animals such as insects, crab and mammals led
to a re-coordination of movements in a way that came as close as possible
to the abilities before the damage. Bethe demonstrated that this adaptation
occurred immediately and spontaneously (that is, without learning), indepen-
dent of higher (cortical) control and in a way that could not have been pre-
programmed (Bethe, 1933). Similar to Goldstein, Bethe originally came from a
localizationist tradition, which he abandoned in the course of his experimental
work. He advocated a systemic view of the brain and criticized to speak of a
“function as if it were contained in a box” (Bethe, 1933, p. 218, my transl.).
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outcome can be caused by different lesions/activations in different
subjects. At least on an ontogenetic scale, this kind of degeneracy
seems to be enormous. This is shown in a range of clinical exam-
ples of normal cognitive-affective development despite severe
lesions in childhood, such as tumor and hydrocephalus, even
to the point of very little brain mass (Lewin, 1980; Borgstein
and Grootendorst, 2002; Feuillet et al., 2007). High degrees of
degeneracy become also manifest in the neurohistology (Amunts
et al., 2000) and functional neuroanatomy (Hamilton et al., 2000;
Burton et al., 2002) of even very “basic” motor and sensory
functions, such as vision. Although there are developmental brain
anomalies that cannot be coped with, developmental plasticity is
so enormous that it seems rather unclear how it could inform
us about localization, at least unless the development is known
in closest detail. This is also reflected in the frequent finding
that similar lesions or diseases of the brain can lead to vastly
diverging ranges of impairment, depending on the amount of
cognitive reserve or brain reserve (Stern, 2002). Interindividual
degeneracy seems a highly relevant, though often neglected factor
at least in earlier imaging studies, as differences in activation
between subjects are oftentimes treated as unsystematic (error)
variance, although this variance probably contains very impor-
tant information (Price and Friston, 2002; Zilles and Amunts,
2013).
MODULARITY: A MUST-HAVE?
Degeneracy within subjects seems even more relevant for our dis-
cussion. As already mentioned in reference to examples of slow-
growing tumors (Desmurget et al., 2007), it can be frequently
observed in brain diseases, to rather impressive extents. It is,
however, not restricted to clinical cases, but also seen in exper-
imental imaging studies on repeated intra-day measurements, in
resting conditions (Blautzik et al., 2013) as well as in experimental
tasks (Gorfine and Zisapel, 2009). Methodically, it relates to the
question of reliability of fMRI measurements (McGonigle, 2012)
as well as to the interpretation of activations: a causal role of a
brain region to an experimental effect cannot be demonstrated
on the basis of correlative (fMRI) evidence alone. This is because
lesions in an area activated in fMRI in response to a task might
not affect performance in the same task, as one or more other
areas might “do the job” equally well. As a solution, it has been
proposed that lesion and imaging studies should be combined in
determining both necessary and sufficient areas for a task (Price
and Friston, 2002). Accordingly, areas should be classified with
respect to their degree of degeneracy for a certain task, that is,
the “minimum number of areas that must be removed before
a function is lost” (ibid., p. 416). Although this proposal is a
progress in comparison to earlier attempts of uncritical mapping,
it still faces problems: it seems still largely based on a static view of
the brain according to which lesions affect functions specifically.
In other words, it still presupposes “modularity and segregation
of sensorimotor and cognitive functions” (Price and Friston,
2002, p. 417). Here, even networks remain more or less static
arrangements comparable to clockworks, collections of fixed and
rigid gadgets, as a result of how the phenomenon is investigated.
More generally, this becomes obvious regarding the notion of a
“brain mechanism”, a common, widely used notion in CNS.
Goldstein (1934, Chapter 2) already criticized Charles Sher-
rington (1857–1952) for claiming that reflexes were perfectly
rigid, uniform and repeatable, literally like the mechanical work-
ing of a steam engine. Goldstein nicely argued that Sherrington’s
interpretation was bound to an isolation of the reflex arc, both
experimentally and conceptually, from the organismic context.
Within the context of these factors, the reflex response may
greatly vary, depending on the “meaning” of stimuli, hormonal
influences, state of arousal of the organism, postural changes
etc. Goldstein did not mean to invalidate reflexes as important
clinical signs, but to demonstrate that reflexes do not make good
mechanisms, at least in the 19th century definition of the term.
It is not my aim to discuss the different (and often vague)
meanings of the term “mechanism” in CNS. In fact, this term
has also been used in a pragmatic sense, i.e., as describing a
causal relation between entities, a relation which may provide
a starting point for further productive research efforts both on
“higher” and “lower” levels of analysis (cf. Craver, 2005, 2006).
Instead, I want to pick up Goldstein’s interpretation that the
uniformity of phenomena may also result from the method of
investigation. Could it not be that the way in which experiments
are constructed in CNS also creates the impression of brain
processes being more stable and fixed than they actually are? It is
in fact a common advice for lab greenhorns that when conducting
(neuro-)psychological experiments: (a) never to run too many
trials of the same condition in one and the same subject; and (b)
never to let one and the same subject take part more than once in
experiments with very similar manipulations, as effects are soon
reduced or even washed out (Bates and Dick, 2000). Why? The
brain is deprived of the possibility to do what it permanently
does in everyday life and for which it was designed: to learn
and to adapt to permanently changing conditions. Interestingly,
the idea that brain processes are highly stable shows up not
only in proponents of imaging research, but also on the side
of their critics, for example in the debate on the reliability of
fMRI data (McGonigle, 2012). The widespread assumption of
fixed and repeatable processes tends to be trustworthy; however,
one does need to consider its limitations more seriously. These
limitations become most obvious in a dynamical systems view on
us as Umwelt-embedded living beings (see also Thompson, 2007,
341ff.).
IS EQUIPOTENTIALISM THE ANSWER?
There is not enough space here to discuss the idea of a specific
localization of cognitive functions and I would not dare to claim
that I can disconfirm it. In fact, it might be a useful heuristic to
design experimental studies, but it seems so dependent on top-
down assumptions and prone to immunization, that it can hardly
be seen as a fact, and indeed resembles a “holy grail” (Friston
and Price, 2011, p. 249).2 Things would be easier if we were able
to independently identify invariant, context-independent basic
2Friston and Price (2011, p. 242) put forward independent evidence from
network theory (Sporns, 2009), which has emphasized the importance of
modularity in networks as a means of robustness (Kitano, 2004), to protect
against external perturbations (such as lesions). With this interpretation,
however, Friston and Price seem to equate neural modularity with cognitive
modularity from the beginning. By contrast, Sporns (2009, p. 195) explicitly
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entities on both sides (neural and mental) which could then be
related to each other empirically. However, it seems rather unclear
how this could be achieved. It seems improbable for the additional
reason that the respective scientific concepts have very different
historical and methodological origins. Accepting that these two
levels of description might to some extent be incompatible may
not be so bad after all as it leaves us with more scientific as well
as clinical approaches than a localizationist success. At least, the
ubiquitous conclusion in many CNS studies of the sort “area A
is responsible for function F” seems underspecified: “Responsi-
ble” neither seems to mean necessary nor sufficient, at least in
a considerable number of cases. As clinical evidence reveals, a
view of dynamic, distributed brain activity seems much more
adequate, where patterns of activation are more important than
activations of particular regions (Bates and Dick, 2000; McIntosh,
2000; Knight, 2007) and where one and the same neuron might
fire in different ensembles of other neurons, depending on the
context (transient plasticity, McIntosh, 2000; or reuse, Anderson,
2010).
Is there no specialization in the brain and is thus equipoten-
tialism (Lashley, 1950) the answer? In fact, Goldstein cannot be
allocated unambiguously to one side of the localization debate.
Considering him as an equipotentialist would wrongly assume
that he did not see the clinical usefulness of lesion-deficit cor-
relations. More importantly, it would mean to stick to a brain-
immanent conception of function. His own approach seems to
be much better described as the outcome of a dialectic process,
as a synthesis between the two sides on a superordinate level
(Wolfe, 2010): the changes due to a lesion can only be adequately
captured on a higher level of description, namely one in which
the relationship between the defect and the whole organism is
decisive. In other words, a function is something that cannot be
investigated in an appropriate way by just looking at the level of
the brain.
In fact, Goldstein (1927, 645ff.) proposed a rather interesting
and—at least for his time—revolutionary view about the brain,
which he conceived of as a “Netzwerk” (network) with explicitly
systemic properties: the brain is always active and incoming stim-
uli shift the distribution of activation within this network (rather
than create it). The brain then attempts to return to its usual
activation states as some sort of individual constants. Goldstein
postulated such constants for all kinds of physiological processes
in the body, as a means to maintain the organism’s identity. Some
stimuli do not induce changes in activation, they are irrelevant.
Those that do are incorporated into a larger system including the
brain (and body). Lesions do not just change local activation, but
they shift activation patterns globally, thereby leading to over-
all qualitative modifications within the system. These modified
distinguishes between the two notions of modularity. In fact, the idea of
mental modules being identical to neural modules seems to undermine the
very idea of robustness rather than to corroborate it. Furthermore, claims
in favor of modularity from an evolutionary perspective (selective structural
changes in response to functional adaptations) seem very appealing at first
sight, though much less supported by empirical evidence as one might
think (see Anderson and Finlay, 2014). On the contrary, despite interesting
exceptions, data seem to support the view that neurons engage in multiple,
diverse behaviors in very different kinds of species (ibid.).
patterns can then be influenced in new ways by incoming stimuli,
also inducing new phenomena. Referring to Gestalt ideas, lesions
change the distinctiveness of foreground to background activa-
tions, thereby rendering processing of stimuli more unstable,
undifferentiated, primitive and inflexible (Goldstein, 1927).
Apparently, Goldstein ingeniously anticipated some very mod-
ern assumptions of dynamical systems theory including the idea
of attractors or steady states (Friston, 1997; Sporns, 2009). Here,
mental functions are seen to depend upon complex, distributed
networks (Sporns, 2009). Brains can maintain different states
simultaneously, and may switch between them depending on
external or internal perturbation (“multistability”, Tognoli and
Kelso, 2014). Lesions lead to overall system changes and to
the creation of new stable states (Sporns, 2009). In dynamical
systems theory, global, qualitative changes can be accounted
for straightforwardly, as they result from bifurcations induced
by changes in control parameters. Such a view is nevertheless
compatible with the idea that neurons and networks are linked
to some mental abilities more closely than to others, due to
differences in connectivity with other central or peripheral net-
works. Such systems could even entail Umwelt properties such
as the subjective experience of stimuli as control parameters
of the system’s dynamics (Thompson and Varela, 2001), very
much in the sense of Goldstein (1927, p. 646). Without going
into detail, a dynamical systems view of the brain seems to be
much more appropriate, especially with respect to the pervasive
clinical observation of global changes which do not seem to be
sufficiently accounted for on the basis of a modular lesion-deficit
approach.
IS SICK JUST DIFFERENT?
As discussed above, there are interesting attempts to take the
concept of degeneracy into account, by combining data from
brain-lesioned patients and imaging data on healthy subjects
(Price and Friston, 2002; Noppeney et al., 2004). However, the
concept of a “deficit” (Price and Friston, 2002, p. 419) seems all
too clear here, as does the concept of “clinical data” (Kandel et al.,
2013, p. 661) or “brain diseases” (Kandel et al., 2013, p. 659). Is
this indeed the case?
Any attempt to define a deficit leads to the question of how
strong a particular data point should deviate statistically from
an average in order to classify it as abnormal. In the end, this
issue is a matter of convention. However, no such agreement
answers the clinical question: what makes a deviance pathological?
Is performance as such the crucial place to look in order to find an
answer to this question? Goldstein has shown that this question
is indeed intricate: first of all, it seems to be intuitively clear
that deviance refers to a purely quantitative analysis. Even though
deviance seems to be associated with disease, the former is not
sufficient for the latter. If it were sufficient, all deviance would
imply a disease, but as the medical notion of “normal variant”
shows, this is clearly not the case. There are numerous e.g.,
anatomical peculiarities which clearly deviate from an average,
but are not seen as pathological (e.g., missing wisdom teeth).
Even though some of these cases are controversial, the fact that
there can be a controversy at all demonstrates that a deviance
in itself does not seem to give a clear definition. Deviance does
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not even seem to be necessary to speak of a deficit: there are
e.g., many brain-damaged patients who deviate clearly from an
average in specific tasks, but get along well in their everyday life.
Thus, what makes a deviance pathological and calls for treatment?
Goldstein’s answer: when there is an imbalance between the
organism and its Umwelt, between possibilities and demands, an
imbalance that cannot be overcome, this is where suffering and
treatment begin. Thus, “deficit” is not just something inside people
(“produced” inside their brains), but can only be understood
from the perspective of a higher order relationship. The aim
of any treatment is to establish a new state of balance which
relies, to a considerable extent, on the subjective perspective of
the patient. The primary aim of any treatment is to enable a
maximum of vital interaction between organism and Umwelt, a
maximum of responsivity (Goldstein, 1934), in which an organism
can unfold its potential. Hence, diagnosis and treatment of brain-
related deficits includes reference to: (i) a relational (organism-
Umwelt) perspective; and (ii) to individual norms, in analogy
to many other bodily processes (Goldstein, 1934). Issues (i) and
(ii) are taken into account by most therapists as a matter of
course, but seem to escape many researchers when working on
“clinical data”. However, all these issues seem not only relevant for
therapy, but for all scientific studies that make reference to brain
damage.
PERSONAL, SITUATED ENCOUNTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE
VIEW OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
Even from the perspective of modern clinical-neuropsychological
practice, Goldstein’s ideas still bear great significance. This is
especially true for his idea that quantified results crucially need
qualifying information from the personal and situational context
in order to be adequately interpreted. In fact, neuropsychological
assessment is a much more complex and integrative enterprise
than is conveyed in the lesion-deficit view of CNS as depicted
above. Essentially, neuropsychological test scores result from an
interaction between patient and examiner (Lezak et al., 2004).
Thus, it would be oversimplified to interpret scores as absolute
and in isolation, i.e., by blinding out the context of their origin
(ibid., p. 108). Test scores are over- and underspecified at the
same time (Lezak et al., 2004): on the one hand, tests are designed
for rather specific aspects, they can hardly be used to capture
global changes, such as in overall behavior or personality. On
the other hand, test scores are very complex entities, influenced
by a diversity of factors. Therefore, they have to be validated (cf.
Goldstein and Scheerer, 1941).
Validating information can come from a variety of sources
(cf. Lezak et al., 2004): the medical history of the patient,
the patient’s premorbid status (occupational demands, abilities,
comorbidities etc.), his/her subjective experience of the changes,
observations from the side of the patient’s family etc. During
the assessment proper, further important sources of information
include: the patient’s general attitude towards the examination
and towards his/her problems (insight into/reaction to deficits,
test anxiety, motivational status), the influence of overlaying
global changes (apathy, concretism, inflexibility, disinhibition),
qualitative aspects of test behavior that are hard to embrace
in a standardized way (bizarre performance, self-comments,
enriching solutions, profit from help etc.) and observations of
behavior in real-world situations (see following sections). In
this process, data from the third-person perspective (such as
the test scores or behavioral observations) are complemented
by the patient’s subjective experience (first-person perspective)
as well as the experience of the examiner in the empathic
interaction with the patient (second-person perspective). Both
first- and second-person perspectives become even more rele-
vant in neuropsychological therapy: including them has proved
to embrace the multiple changes induced by a brain lesion
much better (Ben Yishay, 2008; Gracey et al., 2008; Yeates
et al., 2008) and to contribute essentially to therapeutic suc-
cess (Prigatano et al., 1994; Klonoff et al., 2001; Wilson, 2010,
2011). All these studies converge in the view that therapeutic
success is most appropriately defined as (re-)establishing an
identity and a world of meaning in which patients can realize
their possibilities as best as possible (Wilson, 2010; Prigatano,
2013).
I do not want to argue that test scores should never be used
to address more general hypotheses (Frisch et al., 2013), but
that we should always keep in mind that doing so is a highly
abstract enterprise which intentionally blinds out a lot of qual-
ifying information. Imagine the loss of information that results
from teachers’ attempts to summarize all of a pupil’s performance,
abilities, possibilities, personal problems etc. in the course of a
school year in a few school grades. This does not mean that
grades say nothing at all. Quantifying is also important in clinical
contexts, but if clinicians have nothing else than numbers, they
will miss very crucial things about the brain (and will hardly
be able to help the patient). Thus, sticking to a lesion-deficit
model provides a much more limited picture of the nature of
brain damage in contrast to clinical-neuropsychological practice.
A pure lesion-deficit perspective may suggest that brain damage
just impairs functions, but actually, it changes a world (Luria,
1987). Therefore, clinical practice crucially relies on information
from all three perspectives, 1st, 2nd and 3rd person. None of them
can be claimed superior a priori and none of them should be
taken at face value. Information from all three sources is critically
integrated on the basis of theoretical knowledge, practical expe-
rience and intuition. Thus, clinical-neuropsychological practice
transcends the lesion-deficit model considerably. Therefore, it
seems hasty to applaud clinical neuropsychologists for allegedly
relying on a third-person lesion-deficit approach as a “serious,
scientific way” of study (Dennett, 2003, p. 22), as this does not
well capture clinical work. The first-person perspective is essential
in understanding a brain disorder. Any disorder is first and fore-
most something that is experienced (Toombs, 1995, 2001; Varela,
2001). First-person information is the clinical practitioners’ “daily
bread and butter” (Cytowic, 2003, p. 165) and sometimes the
only reliable information that we can get on a patient. This
may hold for the second-person perspective as well, especially
with respect to the importance of empathy (Toombs, 2001). To
understand a brain lesion (and to treat the person who has
it), both perspectives are indispensable. There are many clini-
cal phenomena that could not be scientifically studied without
them, such as pain (cf. Velmans, 2007), but also perception (see
below; cf. Feest, in press). In addition, they are the entry gate
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for therapeutic interventions (Varela and Shear, 1999; Prigatano,
2003, 2011). This does not mean that they are always taken at
face value, as they are validated using information from other
sources (second- and third-person) (Varela and Shear, 1999; Jack
and Roepstorff, 2002; Velmans, 2007), but this is true for these
other sources vice versa (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002, 2003). One
could also say that a situated encounter between subjects is the
ultimate interpretational frame for clinical-neuropsychological
practice.
Despite the limitations of the lesion-deficit model, it seems to
be desired by neighboring disciplines such as psychiatry (Kandel,
1998; Insel and Quirion, 2005; Kandel et al., 2013). Neurology
is admired for its alleged success in describing diseases as “pure
mechanical, brute (...) affections of the brain” (Graham, 2013,
after Walter, 2013, p. 7). However, from the view that I have
developed here, neurological disorders seem to be much less
“brain-inherent” than the above characterizations might suggest.
At first glance, it seems self-evident that mental changes such as
in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) are directly related to pathological
changes in the brain. Despite strong correlations between patho-
logical burden and clinical deficits, however, these correlations
are far from complete, and there are even individuals who do
not show any measurable cognitive decline despite extensive
AD related pathology (Riley et al., 2002). Such discrepancies
can be explained by differences in the compensatory abilities
of individuals, or rather individual brains (Stern, 2002), but
this interpretation points to two conclusions: first, it presup-
poses a systemic view of the brain, as compensation entails that
the brain’s capacities have to be reorganized in some way or
another. Second, it presupposes a tight coupling with the envi-
ronmental context in which a discrepancy is somehow experi-
enced. These are crucial reference points for any compensational
efforts. Thus, an integrative, embodied perspective onto these
issues (cf. Walter, 2013) seems much more helpful also for psy-
chiatry than narrowing them down according to a lesion-deficit
ideal.
THE EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM IN HUMAN
NEUROSCIENCE: THE ONE AND ONLY?
One might question the general usefulness of clinical-
neuropsychological data for a scientific study of mind and
brain, arguing that they are seemingly too complex. Why not
stick to the good old experimental method when investigating
brain lesions, which seems to provide us with much more
specific and objective results? Certainly, I do not want to argue
against the general utility of experimental methods in studying
mental phenomena. Especially in the area of philosophy of mind,
however, there seems to be a strong preference for the assumption
that the experimental method, which has proved so useful in
other areas of science, can be transferred directly to the study of
the mind (Dennett, 2003). Experiments may even be treated as
a gold standard to investigate the mind scientifically, as “it isn’t
science until you can turn it into . . .. experiments” (Dennett,
2003, p. 23). They are often understood to be powerful enough
to answer even metaphysical questions, such as questions of the
self, morality, freedom of will etc. (see Churchland, 2005, 2008;
Metzinger, 2009; Kandel et al., 2013). This goes hand in hand
with a strong emphasis on a third-person perspective as being
scientific and “real”, while outranging first- and second-person
perspectives, at least as long as the latter cannot be translated
into a third-person view (Dennett, 2003; Churchland, 2005; see
also Jack and Roepstorff, 2002, 2003). Thus, it is not so much the
method itself, but first and foremost the way in which it seems
to be decontextualized and overemphasized that deserves critical
discussion.
Regarding the natural sciences in general, philosophy of sci-
ence has convincingly uttered doubts about the radically objective
nature of experiments and concluded that experiments cannot
establish a complete independence between the observer and the
object under study. A major source for this conclusion comes
from 20th century physics (Primas, 1994). In short, there is
something we put into an experiment and something we get
out, and it is not possible to completely separate one from the
other (Harré, 2003). Taking this for granted, however, one might
nevertheless still postulate that the experimental method should
work in studying mind and brain straightforwardly (Dennett,
2003). But does it?
As we have seen, Goldstein doubted that the experimental
method from physics and chemistry worked equally well in the
area of biology. He insisted that the isolation of biological phe-
nomena as a result of an experimental manipulation runs the risk
of giving a distorted picture of the living. For example, in order to
study animals experimentally, we have to interfere massively with
their genuine state of existence by taking them out of their natural
environment (Umwelt, as part of the organism), to the point of
even killing them to reveal their anatomical and physiological
details. In other words, we deprive them of the very property
that we intend to study: life. Especially in the area of life, we do
not just find phenomena, we create them to a considerable extent
when adopting an experimental procedure. This problem had also
been emphasized in modern physics (Bohr, 1933). In addition to
research on plants or animals, there is a further interesting prop-
erty of humans, namely, that they are interpreting, interacting
subjects. This aspect is blinded out more or less intentionally in
lab experiments, as we only want to have “objective” results in
science that are not contaminated by anything purely “subjective”
(Dennett, 2003). However, this idea from the classical natural sci-
ences becomes very intricate when applied to research on humans:
in all kinds of psychological experiments, it turns out to be impor-
tant to ask the subjects afterwards about additional variables, such
as the strategies applied, whether the experiment was short and
interesting enough to stay concentrated, which hypotheses they
came up with about the study, etc. (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002).
In addition to this first-person perspective, experimenters often
rely on their own intuition about their subjects’ attitudes and
strategies, on the basis of their interaction with the subject (that is,
from a second-person perspective). All this information is crucial
to design experimental paradigms and to interpret results (Jack
and Roepstorff, 2002).
The fact that we often have to rely upon information from the
first- and second-person-perspective to do psychological experi-
ments, but generally disregard it as being not scientific reveals the
highly ambivalent nature of the experimental method in research
on humans. This aspect is already entailed in Goldstein’s projective
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notion of organism (Wolfe, 2010): humans cannot encounter each
other other than as “organisms” (subjects), as participants in an
interaction. This holds true not only for the clinician, but also for
the experimenter (not to mention all sociological issues in actual
scientific practice). By seeing others as subjects, the researcher has
to see himself as a subject as well. Otherwise, no interaction, and
thus no psychological research, would ever be possible. From a
Goldsteinian view, one might say that the third-person perspec-
tive presupposes a second-person perspective and that the former
is derived from the latter in a way (see also Thompson, 2007,
309ff.). The “objectivity” of psychological experiments relies on
an artificial exclusion of these factors. Experimental arrangements
are even designed to blind out these influences. This can indeed be
a useful scientific strategy. However, it creates great confusion if
it is not remembered as being a strategy, and if it is claimed to
produce results that are independent from the notion of a subject.
Human subjects know that they are in an experiment and what
experiments are about, they anticipate goals and hypotheses, they
interact with the experimenter on different levels, they want to
help science or resist to being manipulated etc. These issues have
been thoroughly and extensively investigated in experimental
social psychology for decades (Strohmetz, 2008). Interestingly, the
influence of these factors is almost never systematically addressed
or even discussed in CNS, although it might also considerably
contribute to the problem of diverging and non-replicable results
across studies.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE IN A VAT
To isolate phenomena experimentally is a way to study them,
but it creates problems, as we have seen. A serious problem,
which follows from a contextual isolation, and which arises from
Goldstein’s emphasis on the entanglement between organism and
Umwelt, is external (or ecological) validity, a concept which is
most often neglected in favor of internal validity in CNS. Usually,
there is much more space in the discussion sections of journal
articles devoted to discussions of whether an experimental effect
was in fact caused by the factors as argued, whereas it is mostly
just presupposed that the results are equally valid outside the
experimental setting. For example, it is often taken for granted
that a short-term memory task in the scanner (e.g., an n-back
task) can be unequivocally transferred to short-term memory
performance in real life (e.g., putting different appointments of
a day into a reasonable order). This might well be the case, but the
problem is that it is rarely shown or even put up for discussion.
Studies comparing performances in a specific experimental task
inside and outside the scanner (Koch et al., 2003; Koten et al.,
2013) seem to converge on the view that the general pattern
of behavioral results is comparable, but that there are overall
differences (e.g., in response latencies). Obviously, the scanner
seems to create a special experimental environment compared
to the usual lab setting, and it remains unclear how this affects
imaging results. However, this discussion misses an important
point which outranges the actual problem considerably: it is not
the comparison between different kinds of experimental settings,
but between experimental settings and real world situations. Thus,
it is less the scanner than the experimental isolation from the
environmental context that seems to create a problem.
Clinical neuropsychology, by contrast, has to have an emphasis
on ecological validity (Shallice and Burgess, 1991; Manchester
et al., 2004; Frisch et al., 2012), for different reasons. First of all,
any therapeutic attempt aims at helping a patient to cope with
his everyday life challenges, not at solving problems in abstract
cognitive tasks. Secondly, the real world is an important way to
validate neuropsychological test results, to judge whether they
actually capture the problems of a patient (as revealed from
other sources of information). Although the construction of
neuropsychological tests is much more geared to the real world
than experimental tasks, they are never taken as exact simulations
of real world conditions. Take, for example, executive functions,
the ability to plan, initiate and monitor actions. As Shallice
and Burgess (1991) have shown in a seminal paper, “classical”
executive tests (such as Stroop, Planning, Categorization, Verbal
Fluency, Switching etc.) may reveal normal results in brain-
damaged patients with massive executive problems in everyday
life. This led to further research on the kind of problems that
these patient suffered from (“multitasking”) and to the devel-
opment of new tasks to capture them (Shallice and Burgess,
1991; Burgess, 2000), thereby constantly accounting for the exter-
nal validity of these measures (Alderman et al., 2003; Cuberos-
Urbano et al., 2013). This kind of research nicely supports
Goldstein’s conclusion that the real world, i.e., the relationship
of individuals to the demands of their specific Umwelt, is the
crucial reference point from which the brain should be studied.
However, experimental neuroscience does not seem to have such
a corrective. As long as experimental evidence is only validated
through other experimental evidence, this kind of research can
hardly dispose of the criticism that it produces results that are
detached from the “real world” and based on a principle of
constant self-reference. Instead, it seems necessary to enhance the
ecological validity of studies, e.g., by more forcefully including
behavioral observations or virtual reality paradigms, to name just
two examples.
THE WORK BENCH ENGINE VIEW OF THE BRAIN
One might object that the Shallice and Burgess (1991) example
only demonstrates that the everyday life context is important
to find appropriate tasks. One could still argue that existing
experimental results can be generalized to real world situations
unequivocally. Is there any evidence against this assumption?
Goldstein proposed, with reference to Fuchs’ (1922) findings
on hemianopic patients described above, that even if we can
exactly determine the blind areas in the visual field, this “does
not tell us anything about the function of the calcarine fissure
in real life vision” (Goldstein, 1926, p. 87, my translation). The
determination of visual field defects is the result of an isolating
procedure (perimetry). This is important for diagnostic reasons,
but it is “construed” in some way. This becomes obvious if we turn
to a setting which is a little more natural, such as the studies of
Fuchs (1922). Here, the visual field defect becomes more variable,
as the fovea may dynamically shift into different parts of the
periphery in order to preserve the focus of vision in the center
of the visual field. In the case of such a “pseudofovea” (Crossland
et al., 2007; Kuhn et al., 2012), anatomy seems to step back in
favor of function, that is, coming along in the respective Umwelt as
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best as possible. Anatomically, this may be reflected by top-down
influences of “higher” cortical areas to the visual cortex (Varela
et al., 1991). Something like a pseudofovea only develops for and
in an active interaction with the environment (Noë, 2009).
In fact, it is very surprising how much literature e.g., on
vision is devoted to meticulous descriptions of the respective
anatomy (e.g., retinotopic/tonotopic maps, see Thompson and
Toga, 2003), which guides the explanation of vision defects after
brain damage (Zhang et al., 2006). There exist, however, almost
no systematic reports on how the visual experience changes in the
course of a brain lesion, and how this affects actions of the organ-
ism in its Umwelt. Even in the case of extended visual field defects
(such as hemianopia), these defects are normally not experienced
in the way that they come out in a perimetric examination. As
an example, patients with hemianopia rarely report that half of
their visual field is missing nor do they act that way, although
they normally do notice many problems such as overlooking
objects etc. Even patients who are trained neurologists have to
apply a specific testing procedure, e.g., by slowly moving fingers
from the periphery to the center of the visual field, in order to
determine the actual changes (Cole, 1999)! Each of us lives with
a “natural” visual field defect, the blind spot, which we normally
do not experience and which we can only reveal by also applying
a specific procedure, such as moving two fingers in a certain
distance from each other in front of our eyes. Would we conclude,
however, that the results of this procedure (namely, that one of
the fingers disappears at some point) is how we normally see?
That they demonstrate us our “actual”, “real” way of seeing, even
if we normally do not know this? Likewise, would we conclude
that the perimetry reveals how the hemianopic patients really see?
“Normal”or “real”, relative to what?
In sum, these examples again show that the first-person per-
spective (here, visual experience) provides substantial evidence to
find out interesting issues about brain lesions, and brains (Varela
and Shear, 1999; Cytowic, 2003; Thompson, 2007). This does not
mean that first-person data necessarily increase ecological validity
of experimental settings (cf. Feest, in press), but this point seems
to be beyond the scope of the present paper. Furthermore, exam-
ples such as the one of the pseudofovea nicely show how tightly
perception and action are coupled within the organism-Umwelt
context (Thompson, 2007; Noë, 2009). Isolating phenomena in
a lab setting (here including perimetry) may reveal interesting
results, but it seems problematic to conclude that these results are
necessarily “more real”. As an analogy, even if a car engine is tested
and described as thoroughly and in as much detail as possible, we
may not yet know very much about how the car drives.
CONCLUSION
In mid-19th century Germany, a group of scientists aimed at
establishing materialism in natural science, also with respect to
the mind. They conceived mental phenomena as some sort of
bodily secretion. As an analogy, the brain was seen as a producer
of thoughts just as the kidney was seen as a producer of urine
(Moleschott, 1852/1971; see also Hagner, 2008). Although brain-
kidney (or mind-urine) analogies like these are certainly not
maintained anymore in such a crude form, the general idea of the
brain as a “mind-producer” still seems to be very much en vogue.
Mind and consciousness are often seen as located inside the head,
being a product of the brain’s computational power (Kandel et al.,
2013). Higher-order concepts such as person/organism, meaning
or interaction are then considered as secondary notions resulting
from the interplay of basic neural processes which can be suffi-
ciently identified from a third-person, experimental perspective
as neuroscience’s sine qua non.
It is impossible to discuss all the complex and intricate philo-
sophical and empirical issues that are connected with these claims
and to judge them in their entirety in one paper. Nevertheless,
I have tried to provide a number of arguments from clinical
neuropsychology that question these assumptions, contrary to
widespread intuitions in the field. I am convinced that CNS
would profit from incorporating views of the brain that quickly
become apparent when encountering brain-damaged individuals
in clinical-neuropsychological assessment and therapy, such as:
(i) Brain, organism and Umwelt are deeply intertwined and
interrelated, they constitute a global, highly dynamic system; (ii)
mind is constituted within this interwoven system, from which
it cannot be reasonably isolated in scientific research; (iii) living
systems cannot be fully decomposed into independent, basic units
of explanation (such as brain modules, neurons, genes etc.), but
can only be understood by assuming a non-transparent interre-
lation between supervening whole and lower-scale components;
(iv) living systems are autonomous agents, actively maintaining
an identity within an experienced, meaningful Umwelt, thereby
adapting to perturbations and intrinsically generating norms; and
(v) experimental methods in research on mind and brain are
limited in their validity; they should therefore be complemented
with information not only from more ecological third-person
approaches (e.g., real-world behavior), but especially from first-
and second-person perspectives in order to validate and enrich
them.
All these ideas follow from Kurt Goldstein’s clinical and the-
oretical work, which proves still significant, despite its age and
its—to modern eyes—antique terminology. Notably, ideas such
as those in (i) to (v) are central to the embodiment approach
in cognitive and neuroscience (Varela et al., 1991; Varela, 1997;
Clark, 1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Thompson, 2007)
which, at least from my clinical-neuropsychological perspective,
seems to be much more appropriate for brain-mind research
than concurring isolationist and computationalist approaches. I
would like to explicitly emphasize and acknowledge Goldstein’s
profound contributions to the embodiment approach which are
obvious not only for theoretical, but also for historical reasons.3
3The embodiment approach makes extensive reference to the ideas of two
philosophers, among others, namely Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Varela et al.,
1991; Thompson, 2007) and Hans Jonas (Weber and Varela, 2002; Thompson,
2007). A central figure in this respect is the philosopher Aron Gurwitsch, a
disciple of Edmund Husserl from 1922 onwards. Gurwitsch came to Frankfurt
a few years later to work together with Kurt Goldstein and his most important
collaborator, the Gestalt Psychologist Adhemar Gelb (esp. to work on Gelb
and Goldsteins concept of a loss of “abstract attitude” in the aftermath
of brain lesions). Gurwitsch had to flee Nazi Germany in 1933 to Paris.
Here, he gave lectures at the Sorbonne University on Phenomenology and
Gestalt Psychology, which Merleau-Ponty attended (Gurwitsch and Embree,
2010). Both met frequently and Merleau-Ponty was introduced to many of
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This might enrich as well as strengthen the embodiment endeavor.
Especially the fact that Goldstein developed most of his con-
cepts in his clinical work with brain-damaged individuals seems
particularly interesting in this respect. Conversely, I hope that
these ideas, when spreading in CNS, could act back into the
clinical disciplines, to enhance basic research’s practical benefit,
which in the eyes of many practitioners is largely overestimated
(Wilson, 2005). This could lead to more appropriate principles in
the education of medical and psychological practitioners, which
is often dominated by isolationist, third-person views. Last but
not least, we should be aware that overemphasizing such views
may have disastrous consequences for clinical practice (Toombs,
2001).
Is it the core problem to relate the more global clinical per-
spective to the more fine-grained view of experimental CNS?
This cuts the story too short, as the latter seems to draw from
several problematic assumptions. Thus, there is no one-way street:
clinical practice does not just add to laboratory data, it can
provide an interesting alternative perspective in its own right,
which we would not find when sticking to experimental studies on
healthy individuals. Clinical neuropsychology beyond the lesion-
deficit-model could provide a more appropriate general research
paradigm for CNS. However, progress can only be achieved when
we dare to put even those assumptions into doubt that seem
undoubted. Here, we should welcome external perspectives from
interdisciplinary sources, such as the humanities, but also from
modern physics. In fact, this seems to be the “strongest strength”
of science and the only way to nourish creative power: to be
prepared to give up even the core assumptions if they turn out
to be questionable, and, most importantly, to dare to keep the
questions open.
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Goldstein’s ideas, as is most clearly reflected in the main topics of his first
major work (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1967): Constitution of an Umwelt through
constant self-actualization of an organism, holism in perception, reflex as
an argument against atomistic theories of behavior, norm-giving as essential
property of life, role of symbols in the human mind etc. (cf. Moran, 2002,
411ff.). Many of these issues coined the embodiment approach (Thompson,
2007, p. 147). Hans Jonas got to know both Gurwitsch (Jonas, 1973) and
Goldstein (Jonas, 1959) already in Germany, and all three became colleagues
in their shared U. S. exile (The New School of Social Research, New York).
Hans Jonas, a disciple of Husserl and Heidegger, saw Goldstein as a major
influence (Jonas, 1959) and important issues from his work (Jonas, 1966)
seem to reflect this influence (e.g., life vs. machines, organismic identity and
existential concern). Thus, it turns out that many ideas which fed into the
embodiment approach are rooted in Goldstein’s clinical-neuropsychological
observations. Many thanks to Alexandre Métraux for information on these
issues.
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